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Abstract— While it has been repeatedly shown that learning-
based controllers can provide superior performance, they often
lack of safety guarantees. This paper aims at addressing this
problem by introducing a model predictive safety certification
(MPSC) scheme for linear systems with additive disturbances.
The scheme verifies safety of a proposed learning-based input
and modifies it as little as necessary in order to keep the system
within a given set of constraints. Safety is thereby related to
the existence of a model predictive controller (MPC) providing
a feasible trajectory towards a safe target set. A robust MPC
formulation accounts for the fact that the model is generally
uncertain in the context of learning, which allows for proving
constraint satisfaction at all times under the proposed MPSC
strategy. The MPSC scheme can be used in order to expand
any potentially conservative set of safe states and we provide
an iterative technique for enlarging the safe set. Finally, a
practical data-based design procedure for MPSC is proposed
using scenario optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Learning-based control introduces new ways for controller
synthesis based on large-scale databases providing cumulated
system knowledge. This allows for previously intense tasks,
such as system modeling and controller tuning, to eventually
be fully automated. For example, deep reinforcement learn-
ing provides prominent results, with applications including
control of humanoid robots in complex environments [1] and
playing Atari Arcade video-games [2].
Despite the advances in research-driven applications, the
results can often not be transferred to industrial systems that
are safety-critical, i.e. that must be guaranteed to operate in
a given range of physical and safety constraints. This is due
to the often complex functioning of learning-based methods
rendering their systematic analysis difficult.
By introducing a model predictive safety certification
(MPSC) mechanism for any learning-based controller, we
aim at bridging this gap for linear systems with additive
uncertainties that can, e.g., result from a belief representation
of an unknown non-linear system. The proposed MPSC
scheme estimates safety of a proposed learning-based input
in real-time by searching for a safe back-up trajectory for the
next time step in the form of generating a feasible trajectory
towards a known safe set. Allowing the MPSC scheme
to modify the potentially unsafe learning-based input, if
necessary, provides safety for all future times. The result
can be seen as a ‘safety filter’, since it only filters proposed
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inputs that drive the system out of what we call the safe set.
The resulting online optimization problem can be efficiently
solved in real-time using established model predictive (MPC)
solvers. Partially unknown larger-scale systems can therefore
be efficiently enhanced with safety certificates during learn-
ing.
Contributions: We consider linear systems with additive
disturbances, described in Section II, that encode the current,
possibly data-driven, belief about a safety-critical system to
which a potentially unsafe learning-based controller should
be applied. A model predictive safety certification scheme
is proposed in Section III, which allows for enhancing
any learning-based controller with safety guarantees1. The
concept of the proposed scheme is comparable to the safety
frameworks presented in [3], [4] by providing an implicit safe
set together with a safe backup controller that can be applied
if the system would leave the safe set using the proposed
learning input. A distinctive advantage compared to existing
methods is that the MPSC scheme can build on any system
behavior that is known to be safe, i.e. a known set of safe
system states can be easily incorporated in our scheme such
that it will only analyze safety outside of the provided safe
set.
The approach relies on scalable offline computations and
online optimization of a robust MPC problem at every
sampling time, which can be performed using available real-
time capable solvers that can deal with large-scale systems
(see e.g. [5]). While we relate the required assumptions and
design steps to tube-based MPC in Section IV, we present
an automated, parametrization free, and data-driven design
procedure, that is tailored to the context of learning the
system dynamics. The design procedure and MPSC scheme
are illustrated in Section V using numerical examples.
Related work: Making the relevant class of safety critical
systems accessible to learning-based control methods has
gained significant attention in recent years. In addition to
the individual construction of safety certificates for specific
learning-based control methods subject to different notions
of safety, see e.g. the survey [6], a discussion of advances
in safe learning-based control subject to state and input
constraints can be found in [7]. A promising direction that
emerged from recent research focuses on what is called a
‘safety framework’ [3], [7], [4], [8], which consists of a
safe set in the state space and a safety controller. While
the system state is contained in the safe set, any feasible
input (including learning-based controllers) can be applied
1Even human inputs can be enhanced by the safety certification scheme,
which relates e.g. to the concept of electronic stabilization control from
automotive engineering.
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to the system. However, if such an input would cause the
system to leave the safe set, the safety controller interferes.
Since this strategy is compatible with any learning-based
control algorithm, it serves as a universal safety certification
concept. The techniques proposed in [3], [7] are based on
a differential game formulation that results in solving a
min-max optimal control problem, which can provide the
largest possible safe set, but offers very limited scalability.
The approach described in [4] uses convex approximation
techniques that scale well to larger-scale systems at the cost
of a potentially conservative safe set. While these results
explicitly consider non-linear systems, we focus on linear
model approximations allowing for various improvements.
We introduce a new mechanism for generating the safe set
and controller using ideas related to tube-based MPC, which
enables scalability with respect to the state dimension, while
being less conservative than e.g. [4].
There is a methodological similarity to learning-based
MPC approaches, as e.g. proposed in [9], or more recently in
[10] considering nonlinear Gaussian process models. While
such methods are limited to an MPC strategy based on the
learned system model, this paper provides a concept that can
enhance any learning-based controller with safety guarantees.
This allows, e.g., for maximizing black-box reward functions
(reward of a sequence of actions is only available through
measurements) for complex tasks, see e.g. [11], which would
not be possible within an MPC framework, or to focus on
exploration in order to collect informative data about the
system, as described in Section V.
Notation: The set of symmetric matrices of dimension n
is Sn, the set of positive (semi-) definite matrices is (Sn+)
Sn++, the set of integers in the interval [a, b] ⊂ R is I[a,b],
and the set of integers in the interval [a,∞) ⊂ R is I≥a.
The Minkowski sum of two sets A1,A2 ⊂ R is denoted by
A1⊕A2 and the Pontryagin set difference by A1	A2. The
i-th row and i-th column of a matrix A ∈ Rn×m is denoted
by rowi(A) and coli(A).
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider dynamical systems, which can be described
by linear systems with additive disturbances of the form
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k) (1)
with initial condition x(0) = x0 and w(k) ∈ W where W
is a compact set. The system is subject to polytopic state
constraints x(k) ∈ X := {x ∈ Rn|Axx ≤ bx}, Ax ∈ Rnx×n,
bx ∈ Rnx and polytopic input constraints u(k) ∈ U := {u ∈
Rm|Auu ≤ bu}, Au ∈ Rnu×m, bu ∈ Rnu . We assume that
the origin is contained in X, (A,B) is stabilizable, and the
system state is fully observable. Note that system class (1)
allows for modeling nonlinear time-varying systems x(k +
1) = f(k, x(k), u(k)) if x(k + 1) ∈ Ax(k) + Bu(k) ⊕W
for all (x, u) ∈ (X,U).
We aim at providing a safety certificate for arbitrary
control signals in terms of a safe set and a safe control law.
Given the system description (1) and a potentially unsafe
learning-based controller uL, we search for a set of states
State constraints X ⊂ R2
Safe set S
Safe terminal set Sf
z∗4 ⊕ Ω
z∗1
z∗0 x(k)
x(k + 1)
Fig. 1: Model predictive safe set (blue) based on available data
points (red): Belief-based safe optimal trajectory that supports
uL(k), starting nearby x(t) and resulting in the safe terminal set,
with uncertainty tubes, that will contain the real system state.
S for which we know a feasible backup control strategy uB
such that input and state constraints will be fulfilled for all
future times. Therefore, uL can be applied as long as it does
not cause the system to leave S or violate input constraints.
Otherwise, a safety controller uS is allowed to modify the
learning input based on the backup controller in order to keep
the system safe. Formally this is captured by the following
definition of a safe set and controller.
Definition II.1. A set S ⊆ X is called a safe set for system
(1) if a safe backup control law uB : Rn × Rm × I≥0 → U
is available such that for an arbitrary (learning-based) policy
uL : I≥0 → Rm, the application of the safety control law
uS(k) :=
{
uL(k), if uL ∈ U ∧ {Ax+BuL} ⊕W ⊆ S
uB(x(k), uL(k), k), otherwise
guarantees that the system state x(k) is contained in X for
all k ≥ k¯ if x(k¯) ∈ S.
While this framework is conceptually similar to those in
[3], [7], [4], [8], we do not require the safe set S to be robust
controlled invariant as in [4, Definition II.4], [7, Definition
2], [8, Section 2.2] or [3, Section II.A]. The presented
approach is thereby capable of enlarging any given safe set,
and can be combined with any of the previously proposed
methods.
III. MODEL PREDICTIVE SAFETY CERTIFICATION
The starting point for the derivation of the proposed safety
concept is Definition II.1. The essential requirement is that
in the safe set S, we always need to know a feasible backup
controller uB, that ensures constraint satisfaction in the face
of uncertainty for all future times. The idea for constructing
such a controller is based on MPC [12]. Given the current
system state, we calculate a safe, finite horizon backup
controller towards some conservative target set Sf , which
is known to be a safe set and therefore provides ‘infinite
safety’ after applying the finite-time controller.
The concept is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider a current
system state x(k), together with a proposed learning input
uL(k). In order to analyze safety of uL(k), we test if uL(k)
will lead us to a state x(k + 1), for which we can construct
a safe backup controller uB in the form of a feasible input
sequence that drives the system to the safe terminal set Sf
in a given finite number of steps. If the test is successful,
x(k + 1) is a safe state and uL(k) can be applied. At the
next time step k+ 1, we repeat the calculations for x(k+ 1)
and uL(k + 1). If it is successful, we can again apply the
learning input uL(k + 1), otherwise we can simply use the
previously calculated backup controller from time k. This
strategy yields a safe set that is defined by the feasible set
of the corresponding optimization problem for planning a
trajectory towards the target set.
As the true system dynamics model is often unknown
in the context of learning-based control, we employ mech-
anisms from tube-based MPC to design a safe backup
controller for uncertain system dynamics of the form (1).
A. Model predictive safety certification scheme
Similar as in tube-based MPC, see e.g. [12], a nominal
backup trajectory is computed, such that a stabilizing auxil-
iary controller is able to track it for the real system within
a ‘tube’ towards the safe terminal set. We first define the
main components and assumptions of the tube-based MPC
controller, in order to then introduce the model predictive
safety certification (MPSC) scheme, consisting of the MPSC
problem and the proposed safety controller. Define with
z(k) ∈ Rn and v(k) ∈ Rm the nominal system states and
inputs, as well as the nominal dynamics
z(k + 1) = Az(k) +Bv(k), k ∈ I≥0 (2)
with initial condition z(0) = z0. Denote e(k) := x(k)−z(k)
as the error (deviation) between the system state (1) and the
nominal system state (2). The controller is then defined by
augmenting the nominal input with an auxiliary feedback on
the error, i.e.
u(k) = v(k) +KΩ(x(k)− z(k)), (3)
which keeps the real system state x(k) close to the nominal
system state z(k) if KΩ ∈ Rm×n is chosen such that
it robustly stabilizes the error e(k) := x(k) − z(k) with
dynamics
e(k + 1) = (A+BKΩ)e(k) + w(k) (4)
resulting from application of (3) to the real system.
Assumption III.1. There exists a linear state feedback
matrix KΩ ∈ Rm×n that yields a stable error system (4).
Stability of the autonomous error dynamics (4) implies the
existence of a corresponding robust positively invariant set
according to the following definition.
Definition III.2. A set Ω ⊆ Rn is a robust positively
invariant (RPI) set for the error dynamics (4) if
e(k0) ∈ Ω⇒ e(k) ∈ Ω for all k ∈ I≥k0 .
In order to guarantee that (x, u) ∈ X×U under application
of (3), the state and input constraints X and U are tightened
for the nominal system (2), as described e.g. in [12], to X¯ =
X	Ω and U¯ = U	KΩΩ. There exist various methods in the
literature, which can be used in order to calculate a controller
and the corresponding RPI set according to Definition III.2,
see e.g. [13].
Different from standard tube-based MPC, the model pre-
dictive safety certification (MPSC) uses a terminal set that
is only required to be itself a safe set according to Defini-
tion II.1, which is conceptually similar to the safe terminal
set used in [10]. This allows not only for enlarging any po-
tentially conservative initial safe set, but also for recursively
improving the safe set, as will be shown in Section IV-B.
Assumption III.3. There exists a safe set Sf ⊆ X and a
safe control law uSf according to Definition II.1 such that
Ω ⊆ Sf .
Remark III.4. Note that a standard terminal set as, e.g.
described in [12], also satisfies Assumption III.3. A trivial
choice is therefore Sf = Ω and uSf (k) = KΩx(k).
Based on these components, the proposed safe backup
controller utilizes the following MPSC problem for a given
measured state x and proposed learning input uL:
min
v0,..,vN−1,
z0,..,zN ,u˜
‖uL − u˜‖ (5a)
s.t. zi+1 = Azi +Bvi, ∀i ∈ I[0,N−1] (5b)
(zi, vi) ∈ X¯× U¯, ∀i ∈ I[0,N−1] (5c)
zN ∈ Sf 	 Ω (5d)
x− z0 ∈ Ω (5e)
u˜ = v0 +KΩ(x− z0) (5f)
where we denote the planning horizon by N ∈ I≥1 and the
predicted nominal system states and inputs by zi and vi. Let
the feasible set of (5) be denoted by
XN := {x ∈ Rn|(5b)− (5f)} ⊆ X. (6)
Problem (5) introduces the auxiliary variable u˜, which in-
cludes the auxiliary feedback (5f), ensuring safety of the con-
trol input u˜, as we will show in the proof of Theorem III.5.
The cost (5a) is chosen such that if possible, u˜ is equal to
uL, in which case safety of uL is certified. The controller
resulting from (5) in a receding horizon fashion is given by
κ(x) = u˜∗(x) (7)
where v∗0(x), .., v
∗
N−1(x), z
∗
0(x), .., z
∗
N (x), and u˜
∗(x) is the
optimal solution of (5) at state x.
It is important to note that (5) may not be recursively
feasible for general safe sets Sf . This is due to the fact that
the terminal safe set Sf is itself not necessarily invariant or
a subset of the feasible set.
To this end, we propose Algorithm 1, which implements a
safety controller based on (5). If x(k) ∈ XN we can always
directly apply u˜ (Algorithm 1, line 4). If at a subsequent
time x(k+1) /∈ XN , then we know via (5) a finite-time safe
backup controller towards Sf using (3), from the trajectory
computed to certify x(k) (Algorithm 1, line 9), compare also
Algorithm 1: Model predictive safety certification scheme
1: kinf := N − 1
2: for k = 0, 1, 2, ... do
3: if (5) feasible then
4: Apply u(k) := κ(x(k)) to (1)
5: kinf := 0
6: else
7: kinf := kinf + 1
8: if kinf ≤ N − 1 then
9: Apply u(k) := v∗kinf +KΩ(x(k)− z∗kinf ) to (1)
10: else
11: Apply u(k) := uSf (k) to (1)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
with Figure 1. By Assumption III.3 we can extend this finite-
time backup controller after N -steps with uSf (Algorithm
1, line 11) in order to obtain a safe backup controller for
x(k+ i), i ≥ 0, which will satisfy constraints at all times in
the future. In the case that Sf \ XN 6= ∅, (5) can be initially
infeasible for x = x(0) ∈ Sf . This case can be easily treated
by directly applying uSf (Algorithm 1, line 1 and line 11)
which ensures safety for all future times. Formalization of
the above yields our main result.
Theorem III.5. If Assumptions III.1 and III.3 hold, then
the control law resulting from Algorithm 1 is a safe backup
controller and XN ∪Sf the corresponding safe set according
to Definition II.1.
Proof. If x(0) ∈ Sf \XN , the terminal safety controller uSf
is applied since kinf is initialized to N − 1 in (Algorithm 1,
line 1), which keeps the system safe for all times. We show
that XN is a safe set by first investigating the case that (5) is
feasible for all k ∈ I≥0 and extending the analysis to cases
in which (5) is infeasible for arbitrarily many time steps.
Let x(0) ∈ XN and let (5) be feasible for all k ∈ I≥0
(Algorithm 1, line 4), i.e. x(k) ∈ XN . Condition (5e) implies
by Assumption III.1 that e(k + 1) ∈ Ω and therefore that
x(k+1) ∈ z1⊕Ω, which implies by the tightened constraints
on the nominal state (5c) that x(k + 1) ∈ X. Therefore XN
is a safe set under the safe backup controller κ(x) in (7).
Now, consider an arbitrary time k¯ for which (5) was
feasible for the last time, i.e. x(k) /∈ XN for all k = k¯+kinf
with kinf ∈ I[1,N−1]. Because of (5e) and (5f) we have that
e(k¯ + 1) ∈ Ω and therefore Assumption III.3 together with
(5d) allows for explicitly stating a safe backup control law
based on x = x(k¯) ∈ XN that keeps the system in the
constraints for all future times:
uB(x(i), x, i) ={
v∗
i−k¯(x) +KΩ(x(i− k¯)− z∗i−k¯(x))), i ∈ I[k¯+1,k¯+N−1]
uSf (i), i ∈ I≥k¯+N .
Since (5) was feasible for x(k¯), the corresponding
v∗1 , .., v
∗
N−1, z
∗
1 , .., z
∗
N exist. Therefore in case of x(k) /∈ XN ,
Algorithm 1, line 9 and kinf ∈ I[1,N−1], it follows from
e(k¯+1) ∈ Ω by Assumption III.1 that x(k¯+kinf) ∈ z∗kinf⊕Ω
for all kinf ∈ I[1,N−1].
The last remaining case kinf ≥ N follows from the
observation, that x(k¯ + N) ∈ Sf by (5d) for which we
know the safe control law uSf for all future times by
Assumption III.3. Once a feasible solution is found again, the
counter kinf is set to zero. Consequently we investigated all
possible cases in Algorithm 1 and proved that it will always
provide a safe control input if x(0) ∈ XN ∪Sf , showing the
result.
B. A recursively feasible MPSC scheme
By modifying Assumption III.3 and requiring the terminal
safe set to be invariant for the nominal system, which is the
standard assumption in tube-based MPC, we obtain recursive
feasibility of (5) and can thus directly apply the time-
invariant control law (7) to system (1) without the need of
Algorithm 1. In other words, (7) directly becomes the safety
controller according to Definition II.1.
Assumption III.6. There exists a set Xf ⊆ X¯ and corre-
sponding control law σf : Xf → U¯ such that for all z ∈ Xf ,
⇒ Az +Bσf (z) ∈ Xf .
Theorem III.7. Let Sf = Xf ⊕Ω. If Assumptions III.1, and
III.6 hold, then (7) is a safe backup control law and XN
the corresponding safe set according to Definition II.1. In
addition, XN is a robust positively invariant set.
Proof. We begin with showing recursive feasibility under (7).
Let (5) be feasible at time k. It follows that x(k+ 1) ∈ z∗1 ⊕
Ω because of (5e) and (5f). From here, recursive feasibility
follows as in standard tube-based MPC by induction, see e.g.
[12]. Along the lines of the proof of Theorem III.5, recursive
feasibility implies that XN is a safe set.
IV. DESIGN OF Sf AND Ω FROM DATA
The proposed MPSC scheme is based on two main design
components, the robust positively invariant set Ω, which
determines the tube, and the terminal safe set Sf .
While Sf can be chosen more generally according to
Assumption III.3, we note from Theorem III.7 that we can
in principle also use the same design methods proposed
for linear tube-based MPC. The computation of the robust
invariant set Ω and the nominal terminal set Xf have been
widely studied in the literature, see e.g. [12], [14] and
references therein.
This section presents a different option for the approxi-
mation of a tube and safe terminal set that is tailored to the
learning context and aims at a minimal amount of tuning
‘by hand’. We propose to infer a robust control invariant set
Ω either directly from data or from a probabilistic model
via scenario-based optimization. Secondly, starting from any
terminal safe set, e.g. the trivial choice {0}⊕Ω, we show how
to enlarge this terminal set iteratively by utilizing feasible
solutions of (5) over time.
A. Scenario based calculation of Ω from data
Let {w˜i}Nsi=1 be a set of so-called ‘scenarios’, either sam-
pled from a probabilistic belief about the system dynamics
(1) or collected from measurements. We restrict ourselves to
ellipsoidal robust positively invariant sets Ω = {x|x>Px ≤
1} with P ∈ Sn++, in order to enable scalability of the re-
sulting design optimization problems to larger scale systems.
The corresponding robust scenario-based design problem for
computation of the set Ω is given by
min
P∈Sn++,τ>0
− log det(P ) (8a)
s.t. ∀i ∈ I[1,Ns] :(
A>clPAcl − τP A>clPw˜i
w˜>i PAcl w˜
>
i Pw˜i + τ − 1
)
 0 (8b)
where Acl := A + BKΩ. Problem (8) defines a robust
positively invariant set for the error system (4), if the
condition is enforced for all w˜i ∈ W , see e.g. [14]. The
objective (8a) is chosen such that a possibly small RPI set is
obtained, which increases by definition of X¯ and U¯ the size
of the feasible region of (5), and therefore the size of the safe
set. A stabilizing linear state feedback matrix KΩ according
to Assumption III.1 needs to be chosen beforehand, e.g. using
LQR or H∞ controller design methods.
Proposition IV.1. Consider system (4) and let ns := (n2 +
n)/2 + 1. If (8) attains a solution, then with probability
at least 1 −∑ns−1i=0 (Nsi )i(1 − )Ns−i, the solution is -
level robustly feasible for the corresponding robust problem
imposing (8b) for all w˜i ∈ W , i.e., the probability that there
exists a w˜i ∈ W for which (8b) is violated is less or equal
to .
Proof. The result follows directly from [15, Theorem 1]
similar to the application demonstrated in [16].
B. Iterative enlargement of the terminal safe set Sf
In this section we show how to enlarge the terminal safe set
Sf based on previously calculated solutions of (5), which is
conceptually similar to the data-based terminal set proposed
in [17]. Note, that a larger terminal set Sf according to
Assumption III.3 or Assumption III.6 typically also leads
to a larger feasible set XN , and therefore to a larger overall
safe set S according to Theorems III.5 and III.7.
The main idea is to define a safe set based on successfully
solved instances of (5) for measured system states
x∗M(k) := {x(i), i ∈M(k)} (9)
where M(k) := {i ∈ I[0,k]|x(i) ∈ XN} is an index set
representing time instances for which the system state x(i)
was feasible in terms of (5) during application of Algorithm 1
up to time k.
Theorem IV.2. If Assumptions III.1 and III.3 are satisfied,
and (5) is convex, then the set
SM(k)f := co(x∗M(k)) ∪ Sf (10)
is again a safe set according to Definition II.1 with a safe
backup controller given by Algorithm 1.
Proof. If (5) is convex, then the feasible set is a convex
set, see e.g. [18] and therefore co(x∗M(k)) ⊆ XN . As a
consequence, we can solve (5) for all x ∈ co(x∗M(k)) which
in turn provides the result by the proof of Theorem III.5 (by
replacing XN with co(x∗M(k))) and the fact that the union
of two safe sets is again a safe set.
If Sf ⊆ co(x∗M(k)), convexity of the new terminal set (10)
is ensured and we can iteratively enlarge the initial terminal
set Sf .
Remark IV.3. A practical design procedure in order to
determine Ω and Sf is as follows. Compute Ω based on
measurements as described in Section IV-A and initialize
Sf = {Ω}. Then, during closed-loop operation of Algo-
rithm 1 enlarge Sf according to (10).
In order to provide a similar result with respect
to Theorem III.7 consider the set z∗M(k) =
{z∗1(x(i)), .., z∗N (x(i)), i ∈ M(k)} with M(k) as defined
above.
Corollary IV.4. If Assumptions III.1 and III.6 are satisfied,
Sf = Xf ⊕ Ω, and (5) is convex, then the set
XM(k)f := co(z∗M(k)) ∪ Xf (11)
satisfies Assumption III.6 and XM(k)f ⊕ Ω is a safe set
according to Definition II.1 with safe backup controller (7).
Proof. Follows similarly to the proof of Theorem IV.2.
Using Theorem III.7, we obtain a practical procedure
similar to Remark IV.3 by initializing Xf = {0} and
choosing XM(k)f ⊕ Ω as iterative terminal safe set.
Remark IV.5. Theorem IV.2 also provides an explicit ap-
proximation of the safe set given by (10), which is generally
only implicitly defined. Such a representation can be used
to ‘inform’ the learning-based controller about the safety
boundary, e.g. in the form of a feature using a barrier
function, in order to avoid chattering behavior, as proposed
in [3].
V. APPLICATION TO NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We consider the problem of safely acquiring information
about the partially unknown system dynamics of a discretized
mass-spring-damper system, which is given by x(k + 1) =(
1 0.1−0.3 0.8
)
x(k) + ( 00.1 )u(k) with |u(k)| ≤ 2.5, |x1(k)| ≤ 1,
and x2(k) ∈ [−0.4, 1]. Assume that an approximate model
is given by x(k+1) =
(
1 0.1−0.23 0.78
)
x(k)+( 00.1 )u(k)+w(k)
with mass, spring, and damper parameters, which have a 20%
error with respect to the true parameters. We use the results
from Section IV in order to calculate Ω without deriving
a suitable representation (1), i.e. a suitable W , first. Using
the approximate model and LQR design, we choose KΩ =
(−4.12 − 5.32). Based on Ns = 600 uniformly sampled
measurements {xi, ui, yi}Nsi=1 from the real (but unknown)
Fig. 2: Left: Closed loop simulation under Algorithm 1,
starting from x(0) = [−0.7, 1]. Red color indicates states, for
which ‖u˜− uL‖ > 0. The dotted line shows the first 20 time
steps of the closed-loop trajectory, resulting from application
of uL without the MPSC scheme. Right: Learning-based
control input sequence and applied controller sequence of
MPSC scheme.
system, we generate the robust scenario design problem (8)
with scenarios w˜i = yi −
(
1 0.1−0.23 0.78
)
xi − ( 00.1 )ui. Solving
(8) yields that Ω = {x|x>Px ≤ 1} with P = ( 53.95 11.4711.47 14.55 )
fulfills (8b) for all possible w˜i ∈ W with probability 0.97
according to Proposition IV.1. For the MPSC scheme, we
use a horizon N = 20 and the terminal safe set Sf = Ω as
described in Remark IV.3.
As learning signal we use uL(k) = 2 sin(0.01pik) +
0.5 sin(0.12pik) with the goal of generating informative
measurements according to [19].
A closed-loop simulation with initial condition x(0) =
(−0.7, 1)> under application of Algorithm 1 is illustrated
in Figure 2 with the corresponding safe set. As desired, the
safety controller modifies the proposed input signal uL only
as the system state approaches a neighborhood of the safe
set boundary where the next state would leave the safe set
(indicated in red color). The pure learning-based trajectory
(dotted line, in Figure 2), in contrast, would have violated
state constraints already in the first time steps.
Using a similiar configuration with planning horizon N =
10, we now iteratively enlarge the safe set based on pre-
viously calculated nominal state trajectories at each time
step by following Corollary IV.4. Samples of the nominal
and overall terminal set at different time steps are shown in
Figure 3. After k = 115 time steps, a significant portion of
the state space is already covered by the safe terminal set.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper has addressed the problem of safe learning-
based control by means of a model predictive safety certifica-
tion scheme. The proposed scheme allows for enhancing any
potentially unsafe learning-based control strategy with safety
guarantees and can be combined with any known safe set.
By relying on robust MPC methods, the presented concept is
amenable for application to large-scale systems with similar
offline computational complexity as e.g. ellipsoidal safe
set approximations. Using a parameter-free scenario-based
design procedure, it was illustrated how the design steps can
be performed based on available data and how to reduce
Fig. 3: Left: Iterative enlargement of the nominal terminal
set (11), which is shown at times k1 = 0, k2 = 100, k3 =
115. Right: Resulting safe terminal set Sf = XM(k)f ⊕ Ω
corresponding to the nominal terminal sets at times k1 =
0, k2 = 100, k3 = 115.
conservatism of the MPSC scheme over time by making use
of generated closed-loop data.
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